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Abstract 
Relative efficiencies of antebellum slave farms are suggested by many empirical studies.  
This paper considers a theoretical aspect of those results using a repeated principal-agent 
problem.  Within its theoretical analysis, with relevance to profitability of slave farms, it 
will be shown that when inter-temporal punishments are necessary and when they can 
perform efficiently in production.  Applying those theoretical results, some empirical 
studies on relative profitability and relative efficiencies are discussed.  In the empirical 
study, relative efficiencies of each farm scale—free farms, task farms, and gang farms—
are estimated region by region by a stochastic profit frontier model. 
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1. Introduction 
Many cliometricians study efficiency of antebellum slave farms empirically.  Except for a 
series of study of Grabowski and Pasurka (1988 and 1989),1 relative efficiencies of 
antebellum slave farms over antebellum free farms are suggested after Fogel and 
Engerman (1974a, Ch. 6).2  However, it is also true that those studies on efficiency of 
slave farms have confronted lots of criticism; as such, it is just a numbers game or on 
their estimating method.  The aim of this study is to provide a theoretical foundation to 
the efficiency of antebellum slave plantations from the viewpoint of incentives and re-
evaluate their efficiency with theoretical results. 
     Antebellum planters considered rewarding their slaves were as important as 
punishments for plantation management—avoiding revolts or resistances that usually 
invited gigantic losses.  If sufficient provisions avoided those losses and planters 
committed to afford those costs, plantations would be a reward-driven institution.  
However, it is also intuitively plausible that slave masters could use threat in order to 
enforce their slaves to work at lower provisions if there were not much loss from 
                                                
* This paper is based on the term paper written for the economic history class instructed by Professor 
Robert Margo in Spring 2005 at Vanderbilt University.  I am truly grateful to Kenichi Amaya, Stanley 
Engerman, Stefano Fenoaltea, Hisao Hisamoto, Seiichi Katayama, Hajime Kobayashi, Yasuyuki Miyahara, 
Katsunori Ohta, Hideo Suehiro, Satoru Takahashi, Quan Wen, and all participants of seminars at Kobe 
University and Harvard University for encouragements and many helpful comments on the earlier version 
of this paper.  I would like to give special thanks to Robert Margo and Tadashi Sekiguchi for entire work 
on this paper. 
1 They control data in somewhat doubtful way; cane sugar is excluded from farm products and the unit 
price of peas and beans should be in pound but in bushel.  I correct those issues in this paper to estimate 
technical efficiencies.  See also Field-Hendrey (1995) and Hofler and Folland (1991) for criticisms against 
their studies. 
2 See, for example, Field (1988) and Field-Hendrey and Craig (2004). 
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punishments.  In such a case, plantations would be a fear-driven institution and slaves 
would be severely exploited (Fenoaltea 1985).  Very similar arguments are also given by 
Chwe (1991) for coerced labor farms to be fear-driven and to be inefficient.  However, 
the crux for planters was not to maximize hours of work of their slaves but to maximize 
their productivity (Fogel 1989, pp. 21-29) 
     On rewards and punishments, some historical observations say a managerial problem 
of antebellum slave masters were to reward their slaves and to obtain their exact needs 
than whipping them (for example, Fogel and Engerman 1975, Ch. 4; and Phillips 1918, 
Ch. 14).  Fogel and Engerman, in their study, also suggest antebellum southern slaves 
were not exploited comparing to antebellum free workers—slaves were assuredly 
exploited but its ratio was not so high comparing to tax rate on free workers.  Those 
situations are understandable by considering how antebellum planters were living in the 
South.  If they were living on their plantation with their slaves, revolts would directly 
suffer their lives.  Even if they were living in remote towns, they would be suffered from 
losing their welfare by turmoil on their plantation.  Then we can consider the possibility 
that antebellum slave farms to be fear-driven should be rare. 
     What would be necessary for antebellum plantations to be reward-driven and what 
would be its result?  Intuitively, if plantations were sufficiently profitable to afford to 
supply their slaves with sufficient provisions and losses from resistances were 
sufficiently large, those plantations would be reward-driven and slaves would not be 
severely physically exploited.  If those provisions gave incentives to work hard, those 
plantations would also perform efficiently in production.  Then profitability is the key 
factor for slave plantations to perform efficiently in production and for slaves to be 
sufficiently provided. 
     This paper shows those predictions are theoretically true using a repeated principal-
agent problem and evaluate the result by some empirical studies.  Within the analysis, it 
is shown that when inter-temporal punishment schemes is necessary to be introduced. 
 
2. Theoretical Analysis 
The relationship among masters and their slaves can be regarded as a relationship 
between principals and their agents.  In this paper, I consider repeated interactions 
between a master and a slave.  Within the context of repeated principal-agent problem 
without budget constraints, a strong result by Levin (2003) exists which shows long-term 
relationships between the principal and the agent can be represented by period-by-period 
contracts—say, the one-shot payment scheme.  Then dynamic interactions within those 
contexts have less meaning to implement efficient outcomes.  However, it is violated in 
some cases.  Then incentives should be considered within inter-temporal actions as 
traditional studies do—say, the inter-temporal punishment scheme—such as Radner 
(1985).  Under inter-temporal punishment scheme, some inefficient periods for 
enforcement of efficient actions are necessarily to turn up. 
     Suppose the slave produces a product and the master sells it at the market and 
provides the slave with provisions (payments).  Both of them are risk neutral and there is 
no borrowing and lending.  At the beginning of each period, the slave chooses an action 
whether “work” or “shirk.”  If the slave works, its disutility from working is a positive 
constant represented by 
! 
e > 0.  However, the master cannot observe actions of the slave 
directly but he can check outcomes.  Then levels of provisions of each period are 
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determined in accordance with outcomes whether “good” or “bad.”  If the slave works, 
the good outcome realizes with probability 
! 
"  but its probability declines to 
! 
" <#  if the 
slave does not work.  The repeated game is supposed to start by the non-punishment 
phase and the master provides the slave with the sufficient level of provisions 
! 
W  so long 
as good outcomes continue to realize.  However, if a bad outcome realizes, the master 
punishes the slave with a low level of provisions 
! 
w .  Then the master begins punishments 
for some periods in accordance with punishment schemes—if the punishment is not inter-
temporal manner, it is the one-step payment scheme.  Figure 1 shows the structure of the 
stage game. 
     I also assume the slave does not work to resist if the master deviates from payment 
schedules from then on.  Notice, resistances are not necessarily to be infinite but, in any 
cases, the following analysis does not change largely—what is really necessary is that the 
slave provides sufficient threat to the master not to deviate from providing 
! 
W  in the non-
punishment phase.  This assumption of resistance is plausible because resistances of 
slaves against their masters, which were usually not violent, were common on antebellum 
slave plantations.  Those resistances were often expressed by their shirking postures (see, 
for example, Bauer and Bauer 1942).  If they could shirk behind their masters, the 
assumption of imperfect monitoring neatly represents the situation on antebellum slave 
farms.  Fogel (1989, pp195-196) also reports antebellum planters believed poor 
provisions would invite revolts by their slaves then they supplied more expensive 
provisions (see also Rees et al 2003 for food allocation schedules on antebellum slave 
plantations).  It should be noticed, however, if slaves were not able to implement 
resistances, which might happen when those slaves were separated from other slaves that 
put pressures on their masters, the following arguments were invalid in reality and they 
might be mentally and physically exploited so severely—for example, mistresses. 
     On this game, 
! 
w  can be considered as the payoff above the outside option or the 
subsistence level for the slave.  In particular, the slave has incentives to run away or die if 
payoffs are below 
! 
w  and the minimum level is the subsistence level.  Table 1 shows 
numbers of freed slaves by manumissions and run-away in 1850.  Those numbers show 
both manumissions and run-away were very rare except for Delaware.  In the analysis, 
based on those numbers, possibilities of manumissions and run-away are excluded.  It 
implies masters do not give incentives to their slaves using prospects of future 
manumissions (see, for example, Findlay 1975) and 
! 
w  keeps the level above their outside 
option—for example, getting out of the South to cross the Canadian boarder successfully 
to find a job in Canada.3 
     Consider the incentive compatibility condition of the slave.  For simplicity, I assume 
the master and the slave discount their future by the common discount factor 
! 
" # (0,1).  
This assumption is plausible when they have the same expectation over the probability 
the on-going repeated game halts—caused by bankrupt of plantations, decease of masters, 
abolition of slavery, and so on.  Let 
! 
V
0
 be the continuation payoff from the next period on 
after a good outcome and similarly 
! 
V
1
 be that of after a bad outcome.  Hence, if the 
payment is one-step as Levin, 
! 
V
0
=V
1
 holds.  After a good outcome, the incentive 
compatibility condition is given by 
(1) 
! 
V
0
" (1#$)[%W + (1#%)w]+ $[%V
0
+ (1#%)V
1
] , 
                                                
3 In the case of free laborers, the minimum wage is the expected wage of newly finding jobs but run-away. 
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where 
! 
V
0
 is given by 
(2) 
! 
V
0
= (1"#)[$W + (1"$)w " e]+ #[$V
0
+ (1"$)V
1
] . 
From equations (1) and (2), he incentive compatibility condition can be simplified to 
(3) 
! 
e " (# $%) (W $ w) +
&
1$&
(V
0
$V
1
)
' 
( ) 
* 
+ , 
. 
Subtracting 
! 
"V
0
 from both sides of equation (2) and rearranging terms gives 
(4) 
! 
"
1#"
(V
0
#V
1
) =
1
1#$
$W #V
0
# e[ ] + w . 
Then equation (3) is further simplified to 
(5) 
! 
e "
# $%
1$%
(W $V
0
), 
which tells us incentives can be given by raising 
! 
W  by rewards or reducing 
! 
V
0
 by 
punishments (see also Fenoaltea 1984).4 
     Suppose the master enforces the slave to work some periods in the punishment phase 
(simply say “enforce to work in the punishment phase”) and consider its incentive 
compatibility conditions.  The master has to provide sufficient incentives to work only by 
the payment in the non-punishment phase 
! 
W .  Then the incentive compatible payment is 
increasing in the sternness of punishments.5  Therefore, if the master minimizes the 
payment, such a punishment scheme corresponds to the one-step payment scheme.  Then 
the payment is given by 
! 
W = ˆ W  such that 
(6) 
! 
ˆ W =
e
" #$
+ w . 
     A question here is that whether the master has an incentive to enforce the slave to 
work during the punishment phase and compensate his efforts during the non-punishment 
phase.  Consider a situation such that a bad outcome has realized and the master begins 
punishment.  Then the slave must make efforts with lower provisions for some periods 
expecting future compensations.  Because their discount factors are common, their 
present values of compensations coincide with each other.  Hence, any punishment 
schemes are indifferent for the master in the punishment phase.  However, by assumption, 
we consider the game starting by the non-punishment phase.6  Then the master can 
maximize the continuation profit by minimizing the payment in the initial period, which 
is 
! 
ˆ W .  Therefore, the one-step payment scheme is the most preferable scheme for the 
master to implement production efficiency (see also Levin 2003). 
                                                
4 For example, if the extra payment (bonus) to the minimum payment is at the same level through periods, 
by the risk neutrality assumption, 
! 
W  can be decomposed into the bonus 
! 
b and the minimum payment; and 
! 
V
0  can be decomposed into appropriately discounted bonus term with the discount factor 
! 
"  and the 
minimum payment.  Thus  
! 
W " V
0
= (1" #)b + w  holds.  Because 
! 
"  is decreasing in sternness of 
punishment schemes, the master can give incentives to work in the non-punishment phase either by giving 
more bonus payments or stipulating severer punishments. 
5 For example, consider a two-period perfect monitoring game; the initial stage starts by the minimum 
payment 
! 
w  (punishment phase) and then a higher payment 
! 
W  is made in the second period (non-
punishment phase) to enforce working those two periods.  Then 
! 
W  must be sufficiently higher to 
compensate efforts in the initial period. 
6 Notice, even if the game starts by the punishment phase and arbitrary punishment schemes are chosen, the 
production efficiency is unaffected and welfare is also unchanged in the long run.  In those cases, 
provisions in the non-punishment phase tend to be huge comparing to the one-step payment scheme. 
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Proposition 1     Suppose the master and the slave are risk neutral; they discount their 
future by the common discount factor; the game starts by the non-punishment phase; the 
master enforces to work in the punishment phase; and there is no budget constraint.  
Then the one-step payment scheme maximizes the continuation profit of the master. 
 
     In the next, suppose the master does not intend to have the slave work during the 
punishment phase.  In this case, the master does not have to compensate the disutility 
from working in the punishment phase.  Hence, the master can reduce payments in the 
non-punishment phase to lower levels than 
! 
ˆ W using fears from inter-temporal 
punishments, which corresponds to reduce 
! 
V
0
 within equation (5) to keep margins (see 
also Chwe 1991).  In this case, losses from punishments to the master come from 
inefficient productions during the punishment phase.  The optimum sternness of 
punishment schemes can be determined in terms of gains from fewer provisions during 
the non-punishment phase and losses from inefficient productions during the punishment 
phase. 
     We need to consider which strategies—using the one-step payment scheme or inter-
temporal punishment schemes—are more profitable for the master.  Let 
! 
ˆ "  be the 
expected profit for the master under the one-step payment scheme and 
! 
˜ " 
0
 be the 
continuation profit for the master after a good outcome under inter-temporal punishment 
scheme of which the master does not have the slave work in the punishment phase.  Then 
they are respectively given by 
(7) 
! 
ˆ " =#(Y $ ˆ W ) + (1$#)(y $ w)  
and 
(8) 
! 
˜ " 
0
= (1#$) %(Y # ˜ W ) + (1#%)(y # w)[ ] + $ % ˜ " 0 + (1#%) ˜ " 1[ ] , 
where 
! 
Y  and 
! 
y  are profits from a good outcome and a bad outcome respectively, and 
! 
"
1
 
is the continuation profit for the master after a bad outcome.  Note, because punishments 
are not one-step, 
! 
˜ " 
0
> ˜ " 
1
 holds.  Then subtracting 
! 
"#
0
 from equation (8) to get 
(9) 
! 
˜ " 
0
=#(Y $ ˜ W ) + (1$#)(y $ w) $
%
1$%
(1$#)( ˜ " 
0
$ ˜ " 
1
). 
From equations (7) and (9), we have 
(10) 
! 
ˆ " # ˜ $ 
0
=%( ˜ W # ˆ W ) +
&
1#&
(1#%)( ˜ $ 
0
# ˜ $ 
1
) . 
Therefore, we can say the one-step payment scheme is more profitable than the inter-
temporal punishment scheme and the farm performs efficiently if and only if the 
following condition holds. 
(11) 
! 
"(1#$)( ˆ W # ˜ W ) % $(1#")( ˜ & 
0
# ˜ & 
1
)  
Condition (11) tells us that the one-shot payment scheme cannot be a plausible contract 
scheme if the principal loses less from inefficient productions in the future or needs much 
payment at present to employ the one-step payment scheme.  They can be summarized as 
follows. 
 
Proposition 2     Suppose there is no budget constraint.  The one-shot payment scheme is 
more profitable to the master if and only if the expected losses from punishments in the 
future (future costs) is larger than the difference between normalized instantaneous 
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expected payments of two schemes (present costs).  Otherwise, inter-temporal punishment 
schemes will prevail and there appear inefficient periods. 
 
     Let me introduce a budget constraint.  In order to activate the constraint, I assume the 
one-shot payment scheme is infeasible by the budget constraint and the master needs to 
consider inter-temporal punishment schemes, which infers the farm is not sufficiently 
profitable.  It is also noted that the master has to bear inefficient periods by punishments 
because there is no room for compensation payments to the slave to work in the 
punishment phase.  The corresponding payment must satisfy the incentive compatibility 
condition—condition (5)—as well as the budget constraint.  In those cases, the master 
needs to control the continuation payoff of the slave in accordance with the budget 
constraint and incentives to work in the non-punishment phase.  Specifically, since 
! 
V
0
 is 
a decreasing function of the sternness of punishment schemes, the master can reduce 
! 
V
0
 
ultimately down to its infimum.  In the case the budget constraint does not allow paying 
the payment of which 
! 
V
0
 is at the infimum, then it is impossible to implement working.  
With Proposition 2, the relevance between efficiency in production and profitability can 
be summarized as follows. 
 
Remark 1     Suppose farms are sufficiently profitable and they do not face any budget 
constraint.  Then those farms perform efficiently in production if losses of profits from 
inefficient periods are sufficiently large.  In turn, if they are not sufficiently profitable and 
face a budget constraint.  Then they cannot perform efficiently.  For slaves, they are 
sufficiently provided if their plantations are efficient, otherwise, they will be driven by 
fear from punishments with lower provisions.  Bullets and a bold line on Figure 2 show 
those each equilibrium. 
 
3. Relative Efficiency of Antebellum Farms 
By Remark 1, we have seen that profitability is the pivotal factor for production 
efficiency.  Then their efficiency can be verified from the viewpoint of their profitability.  
A pioneering work by Conrad and Meyer (1958) estimated some financial indices and 
suggested profitability of antebellum slave farms were extremely high (see also Phillips 
1918).  On Russian serf farms, Domar and Machina (1984) also shown that they were not 
necessarily to be unprofitable as Marxists insisted.  A general equilibrium model by 
Bergstrom (1971) also shows resource allocations of slave economy, which imposes 
restrictions on slaves’ consumption, can achieve their efficiency, then, slave farms can 
enjoy a great deal of profit. 
      The Parker-Gallman sample provides the fundamental data to this section, which 
contains 5,228 southern cotton farms within eleven states—Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Virginia—in 1859 based on the 1860 U.S. census.  Within the sample, one observation is 
deleted because its state is ambiguous, fifty-three were because of zero output, and 
eighty-six observations were because zero input in accordance with following 
adjustments.  Then 5,088 observations are used.  In order to compare region by region, 
those states are classified into three regions—New South, Old South, and Others (see 
Table 3).  Their profitability is estimated by a stochastic profit frontier model, which is 
often used in recent studies of relative efficiency of antebellum farms (see Aigner, Lovell, 
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and Schmidt 1977).  Suppose 
! 
Y  represents the logarithm of the sum of dollar values of 
each product and 
! 
X  represents inputs, which consist of labor 
! 
L , land 
! 
T , and capital 
! 
K  
(adjustments are mentioned later).  Let the production function be 
! 
f (X) and then the 
empirical model is given by 
(12) 
! 
Y = a + f (X) + "  such that 
! 
" = v # u , 
where 
! 
u " 0 is the inefficiency term distributed as half-normal and 
! 
v  is the random error 
distributed as normal.  The production function is assumed to be a trans-log form.  
     The price data collected and electrically published by Haines et al (2005) is applied to 
converting outputs into appropriate dollar values (see Table 3).  The prices of rice cotton 
are reported in per pound price while the Parker-Gallman sample reports rice productions 
in bushels and cotton productions in bales.  Here, 100 pounds per bushel and 400 pounds 
per bale calculate respective dollar values of rice and cotton.  Prices of three sorts of 
molasses—maple, cane, and sorghum—are reported but there in no classification in the 
Parker-Gallman sample.  In this study, I assume all farms produce the same ratio of each 
sort of molasses—maple molasses 0.095, cane molasses 0.355, and sorghum molasses 
0.540—which is calculated from average share of productions in states within the sample 
in 1859 reported on Haines et al.  Then the weighted average unit price of molasses is 
0.625 dollars per gallon. 
     Labor is adjusted to the equivalent level to prime-hand slaves by the procedure of 
Fogel and Engerman (1975b and 1977) as follows.  All slaves and free laborers of ages 0-
9 and 60-over are excluded from the calculation.  Weights on male slaves are 0.40 for ages 
10-14, 0.88 for ages 15-19, 1.0 for ages 20-54, and 0.75 for ages 55-59.  Weights on free 
male laborers ages 15-59 are the same as weights on male slaves.  Weights on female 
slaves are 0.75 times the corresponding weights on male slaves.  Free females ages 10-59 
and free males ages 10-14 (boys) on farms with 0-5 slaves are 0.5 times the corresponding 
weights on male slaves. For free females ages 10-59 and free boys ages 10-14 on farms 
with 6-50 slaves are 0.5 times a specific discount factor 
! 
"  given by the next formula. 
(13) 
! 
" =1+
5 # (number of slaves)
45
 
Then 
! 
"  is one at farms with five slaves and linearly declines to zero at farms with fifty 
slaves.  Hence, females and free boys on farms with over fifty slaves are not counted. 
     For land inputs, acres of improved land are applied.  In order to evaluate farm capital, 
Primack’s ratio of which estimated “value of land” to “value of farm building” is applied 
(Primack 1965, p. 116).  Table 4 gives those ratios for southern states—Southeast for 
Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina; South Central for Arkansas, Alabama, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee; and Southwest for Texas.  In addition to farm buildings, farm 
machinery and livestock, both of which are reported in dollar value in the sample, are 
also added to values of farm capital.  Annual input values employ adjustment rates—rate 
of return on capital and annual rate of depreciation—given by Fogel and Engerman’s 
study.  The rate of return on capital is 10 percent; the annual depreciation rate for 
building is 2 percent; and the annual rate of depreciation of machinery is 10 percent.  
Sums of those values constitute capital inputs of each farm. 
  After those adjustments, log-likelihood estimators of the production function and 
standard deviations of 
! 
u  and 
! 
v , which are given by 
! 
"
u
 and 
! 
"
v
, are given by Table 5, 
where 
! 
" 2 ="
u
2
+"
v
2  and 
! 
" =#
u
#
v
.  Those estimators calculate technical efficiencies 
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on Table 6.  Farms are classified into four classes; “huge slave farms” which possess over 
51 slaves ages 10-59, “large slave farms” which possess 16-50 slaves, “small slave 
farms” which possess 1-15 slaves, and “free farms.”  Figure 3 gives its distribution with 
relevance to profits.  On average, Table 6 shows small slave farms and large slave farms 
are more efficient than free farms in the same region at 95 percent confidence level 
except for in the Old South.   In the Old South, superiority of slave farms is doubtful from 
the standpoint of profit efficiency of agricultural products.  However, at least out of the 
Old South, we can say small and large slave farms performed relatively more efficiently 
on average to make profits in the antebellum South (see also Conrad and Meyer 1958).7 
     We can also find a sort of structural change around the point the logarithm of output 
value is ten, say the critical point, on Figure 3.  Across the critical point, profits are 
almost irrelevant to efficiency on the left while they are positively correlated each other 
on the right.  Then, according to Remark 1, those observations can be considered farms 
whose profits are less than the critical point cannot afford sufficient payments to 
implement efficient actions—although words “master” and “slave” are used in the model, 
the mechanism to enforce working is not altered.  Suppose the critical value is 9.5, then 
35.7 percent of free farms—918 out of 2,574—are below the critical value and they 
would not be able to implement efficient actions of their laborers while huge slave farms 
o f 4.5 percent—3 out of 67, large slave farms of 3.6 percent—15 out of 412, and small 
slave farms of 19.1percent—388 out of 2,035.  In this vein, profitability and efficiency 
cannot be argued separately and then there is no clear answer for arguments of which 
slave farms were not relatively efficient but simply their scales were relatively large 
(David and Temin 1974 and 1976; and Fogel and Engerman 1980).8 
     In order to verify the relation between profitability and efficiency, per-capita outputs 
are examined.  Per-capita means here output value per adjusted labor equivalent to prime-
hands because rewards are determined in accordance with their productivity (see Rees et 
al 2003 for food allocations).  Figure 4 shows their relations.  We can find a pattern such 
that efficiency is extremely low in lower per-capita output below 7.2—per-capita output 
value of about 1,339 dollars—then it jumps up as per-capita output goes up.  Total values 
of outputs and per-capita values of outputs correlate by 0.9640 and then 1,319 farms of 
which 914 free farms, 386 small slave farms, 16 large slave farms, and 3 huge slave 
farms still fall short of the critical value of 7.2 (see Table 7 for more detail).  Technical 
efficiencies of farms above the critical value is provided by Table 8 and then comparisons 
within each region we find there is no significant difference among farms with respect to 
their scales and it also does not matter whether they are free or not (see also Grabowski 
and Pasurka 1988 and 1989).  
     We need to take particular note on the fact that the jump is not the cause of scale 
production because some staple crops such as bushels of corn and bales of cotton do not 
show any correlation with technical efficiency as plotted by Figure 5 and Figure 6.  
Applying the result in the previous section, its inefficiency can be regarded as the result 
                                                
7 On the argument of profit efficiency in the Old South, effects of slave exporting business shall be 
considered together (see, for example, Miller1965; and Lowe and Campbell 1976). 
8 In order to explain relative efficiency of slave farms, many others often insist the gang system—
managerial method that effectively utilizes division of labor on large plantation.  An interesting empirical 
study is provided by Toman (2005), which estimates how much productivity will be improved by 
exploiting comparative advantages of various types of slaves. 
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of insufficient provisions.  In this sense, because larger farms could make potentially 
more profit than small farms, slave farms, which were usually relatively larger than free 
farms, would have sufficient rooms for providing sufficient provisions to give incentives 
to work and then they were likely to perform efficiently in production than free farms on 
average. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The arguments on relative efficiency of slave and non-slave farms were also a main topic 
in this field.  This paper tried to provide a theoretical explanation of the statement by 
Fogel and Engerman—slave farms performed more efficiently than free farms.  In their 
original studies, results were followed by aggregated census data while followed studied 
applied newly introduced econometric methods with micro data, as such stochastic 
frontier models.  Then the concept of “efficiency” became ambiguous; efficiency in 
production or efficiency in making profits as such pointed out by David and Temin. 
     An important contribution of this study shall be the result of which those two 
efficiency concepts are related; if per-capita profits are sufficiently high to cover 
sufficient provisions to give incentives and then those farms would perform efficiently in 
production.  Then we can say slave farms were relatively more efficient than free farms 
because slave farms often maintained larger land and laborers to make more profit than 
free farms.  With such a notion, their relative efficiency should be strongly related to the 
topic why larger farms preferably demanded slave labor.  Its answer could not be 
provided in this study and still open question in general but a possible one would resort to 
the gang system; free laborers cannot endure hard tasks under the gang system—or, they 
could obtain better jobs than as a farmhand on large plantations.  Unless highly organized 
divisions of labor seen in the gang system were feasible, large plantations could not be 
managed effectively as contemporary large companies divide their workers into divisions. 
     In the empirical section, the evidence showed the existence of the critical point of 
which farms perform efficiently in production or less efficiently.  Those observations 
implied some farms could not afford supplying provisions to keep incentives to work 
every period—one-step payment scheme—and then those planters would manage their 
farms with inter-temporal punishment schemes that allows those planters to reduce 
payments for their laborers to give sufficient threat to work. 
     Along with arguments on the one-step or inter-temporal schemes, we could also 
recognize if threats or resistances and revolts were large and losses from those incidents 
were expected to be large, planters would manage their laborers using rewards.  However, 
if those rewards were too high, threats were used to drive their labor.  Therefore, 
treatments of slaves would not depend on benevolence of slave owners but profitability 
of their plantations as well as their balance of power. 
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Figure 1: Game Tree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Equilibrium Payment Schedules and Punishments 
 
 13 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Technical Efficiency vis-à-vis Output Value 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Per-Capita Output and Technical Efficiency 
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Figure 5: Efficiency and Corn Production 
 
 
Figure 6: Efficiency and Cotton Production
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Table 1: Manumitted and Fugitives in 1850 
State Manumitted Fugitive Slave Population 
Alabama 16 29 342,844 
Arkansas 1 21 47,100 
Delaware 277 26 2,290 
Florida 22 18 39,310 
Georgia 19 89 381,682 
Kentucky 152 96 210,981 
Louisiana 159 90 244,809 
Maryland 493 279 90,308 
Mississippi 6 41 309,878 
Missouri 50 60 87,422 
North Carolina 2 64 288,548 
South Carolina 2 16 384,984 
Tennessee 45 70 239,459 
Texas 5 29 58,161 
Virginia 218 83 472,528 
Source: 1850 U.S. Census 
 
Table 2: Classification of Regions for Dummies 
New South Arkansas, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas 
Old South North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia 
Others Florida, Georgia, and Tennessee 
 
Table 3: Dollar Unit Prices of Agricultural Products 
Product Unit Price Unit Product Unit Price Unit 
Wheat 1.02 bu. Rye 0.77 bu. 
Corn 0.46 bu. Oats 0.34 bu. 
Rice 0.0232 lb. Tobacco 0.09 lb. 
Cotton 48 lb. Wool 0.18 lb. 
Peas & Beans 0.73 bu. Irish Potato 0.37 bu. 
Sweet Potato 0.48 bu. Barley 0.58 bu. 
Buckwheat 0.52 bu. Wine 0.28 gal. 
Butter 0.083 lb. Cheese 0.04 lb. 
Hay 8.76 ton Clover Seeds 5.01 bu. 
Grass Seeds 2.78 bu. Hops 0.09 lb. 
Dew Rotted Hemp 67 ton Water Rotten Hemp 67 ton 
Other Hemp 67 ton Flax 0.06 lb. 
Flax Seeds 1.15 bu. Silk Cocoons 11.94 lb. 
Maple Sugar 0.09 lb. Cane Sugar 81.25 lb. 
Maple Molasses 0.87 gal. Cane Molasses 0.273 gal. 
Sorghum Molasses 0.82 gal. Beeswax 0.29 lb. 
Honey 0.15 lb.    
Source: Haines et al (2005) and Craig (1993) 
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Table4: Primack’s Ratio for Southern States in 1860 
Southeast South Central Southwest South Carolina Virginia 
4.5 5.0 6.9 4.5 4.0 
Source: Primack (1965; Table 1 and Table 2) 
 
Table 5: Estimated Production Function 
 Coef. (Std. Err.) p-value 
! 
lnT  0.3403 (0.1815) 0.061 
! 
lnK  0.3698 (0.1764) 0.036 
! 
lnL  -0.0127 (0.2391) 0.958 
! 
lnT " lnT  -0.0245 (0.0181) 0.177 
! 
lnT " lnK  0.0907 (0.0442) 0.040 
! 
lnT " lnL  -0.1780 (0.0607) 0.003 
! 
lnK " lnK  -0.0800 (0.0316) 0.011 
! 
lnK " lnL  0.3099 (0.0617) 0.000 
! 
lnL " lnL  -0.0643 (0.0487) 0.187 
Constant 9.5753 (0.3946) 0.000 
! 
"
v
  0.5103 (0.0172) — 
! 
"
u
  3.9245 (0.0438) — 
! 
" 2  15.6617 (0.3418) — 
! 
"   7.6912 (0.0493) — 
Source: Parker-Gallman sample 
 
Table 6: Estimated Technical Efficiencies 
Region Mean (Std. Err.) [95% Conf. Interval] Obs. 
Huge slave farms of over 51 slaves ages 10-59 
All 0.2194 (0.0186) [0.1823, 0.2564] 67 
New South 0.2152 (0.0238) [0.1669, 0.2635] 39 
Old South 0.1642 (0.0362) [0.0866, 0.2419] 15 
Other 0.2955 (0.0426) [0.2026, 0.3884] 13 
Large slave farms of 16-50 slaves ages 10-59 
All 0.2983 (0.0080) [0.2824, 0.3141] 412 
New South 0.3584 (0.0100) [0.3386, 0.3781] 230 
Old South 0.1711 (0.0149) [0.1414, 0.2009] 74 
Other 0.2574 (0.0140) [0.2296, 0.2852] 108 
Small slave farms of 1-15 slaves ages 10-59 
All 0.2630 (0.0046) [0.2539, 0.2720] 2,035 
New South 0.3262 (0.0068) [0.3128, 0.3396] 990 
Old South 0.1505 (0.0070) [0.1368, 0.1642] 455 
Other 0.2435 (0.0079) [0.2279, 0.2591] 590 
Free farms 
All 0.2173 (0.0044) [0.2087, 0.2258] 2,574 
New South 0.2490 (0.0058) [0.2377, 0.2603] 1,566 
Old South 0.1232 (0.0085) [0.1065, 0.1399] 393 
Other 0.1965 (0.0085) [0.1798, 0.2133] 615 
Source: Parker-Gallman sample 
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Table 7: Farms below the Critical Per-Capita Output Value 
 All New South Old South Other 
All 1319 642 330 347 
Free Farms 914 484 206 224 
Small Slave Farms 386 151 117 118 
Large Slave Farms 16 6 6 4 
Huge Slave Farms 3 1 1 1 
Source: Parker-Gallman sample 
 
